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Abstract 
This study examines the influence of the institutional framework of European countries: more 
specifically coordinated market economies and liberal market economies on the earnings 
management and corporate social performance nexus. Employing econometric models 
impervious to endogeneity, our results show that socially responsible firms (particularly those 
with high governance scores) in coordinated market economies engage in earnings management. 
These findings suggest that in countries in which institutional settings enable implicit 
undertakings of corporate social responsibility in firm policies, firm practices ostensibly related to 
corporate social performance may serve purposes other than meeting stakeholders’ ethical 
expectations and those of society at large. 
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1 Introduction 
There has been significant debate on the merits of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities 
on the bottom line of firms, and the previous literature offers mixed views of CSR’s role. 
For instance, Friedman (1970) and Jensen (2001) contend that the firm’s primary objective is to 
generate profits and that any spending on CSR is necessarily in contravention of this goal. 
Similarly, Aupperle et al. (1985) note that expenditures on socially responsible initiatives reduce 
firm profitability. Moreover, antagonists of CSR have maintained that expending resources on 
socially responsible undertakings can be unprofitable and render firms not viable (Michelon et al. 
2013). Under agency theory, CSR activities may not only be an irresponsible use of resources but 
also the outcome of shareholder-manager agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Alternatively, Mahmood and Humphrey (2013) note that although profit maximisation can 
enhance financial performance, it might also adversely affect the views of stakeholders at large 
and lead to detrimental effects on a firm’s long-term growth and sustainability. This finding might 
be attributable to the extensive outlook of business performance, which has been expanded from 
a purely financial notion to include environmental and social features and is often referred to as 
“the triple bottom line” (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez 2010). According to instrumental 
stakeholder theory, CSR activities can also help firms reduce transaction costs and improve 
access to resources by creating value (Foss and Foss 2005). More precisely, by increasing 
transparency (Kim et al. 2012) and mitigating managerial opportunism, CSR activities reduce 
information asymmetry and agency problems. In general, as globalisation has fostered easier 
access to information and growing stakeholder involvement in firm activities, CSR can no longer 
be understood as merely a discretionary obligation but instead should be conceived of as the 
strategic impetus for corporate success. In this context, social responsibility and transparency 
must be integrated into business operations to meet stakeholder expectations (Amaladoss and 
Manohar 2013). 
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In this paper, we examine the role played by CSR and analyse the relationship between the level 
of agency problems, as proxied by the earnings management (EM) that firms undertake, and 
firms’ corporate social performance (CSP). In addition, we provide fresh insights into the 
influence that a firm’s institutional environment wields on its agency problems. Neo-institutional 
theory posits that corporations are embedded in a nexus of formal and informal frameworks 
providing behavioural guidelines to firms and their managers. Matten and Moon (2008) defined 
institutional frameworks not only as the formal organizations of government, society and 
corporations but also as the norms, incentives, and rules that together wield influence over 
managerial decisions. In particular, we focus on the coordinated market economies of continental 
Europe and on the liberal market economies of the Anglo-Saxon countries. In the former, 
stakeholder involvement is highly institutionalised, and firms must at a minimum communicate 
their social initiatives (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010). Consequently, CSR in coordinated market 
economies tends to be embedded in firm policies (Matton and Moon 2008). By contrast, in 
liberal market economies, the absence of institutionalised stakeholder involvement allows firms 
to choose their principal stakeholder and to communicate their activities by explicitly articulating 
their social policies and practices to this principal stakeholder (Ioannou and Serafeim 2012).  
We investigate the relationship between EM and CSP using data on European countries covering 
the period beginning in 2002 and continuing through 2013 from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 
(ASSET4). European-wide data are of special interest to us as these data cover member countries 
in different institutional settings. The countries’ institutional frameworks are classified as either or 
coordinated market economies or liberal market economies using the classification developed by 
Matten and Moon (2008). In addition, we investigate whether the manifestation of agency 
conflicts as proxied by the level of EM can be attributed to cross-sectional variations in CSP 
empowered by the institutional environment. 
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The previous literature has examined the relationship between EM and CSP (Chih et al. 2008; 
Gargouri et al. 2010; Scholtens and Kang 2012). However, Baughn et al. (2007), Duran and Bajo 
(2012), Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), Martínez-Ferrero et al. (2016) and Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. 
(2016) have specifically shown that the institutional frameworks within which firms operate affect 
firm CSP. We attempt to combine these two streams in the literature by shedding more light on 
the effect that institutional settings have on the relationship between EM and CSP. 
This study contributes to the literature various ways. First, it highlights the importance of the 
institutional context to CSR studies. Moreover, understanding the effects of the institutional 
context is particularly relevant when there are increasing efforts to harmonise policies across 
regions and countries, such as in the case of Europe. Finally, our results offer important insights 
into issues of CSR that are relevant to both regulators and stakeholders alike. 
Our findings thus have several implications. First, regulators should pay particular attention to 
the suitability of legislation for particular national contexts prior to adopting international 
legislation. Second, this study offers regulators insights into those areas upon which new 
regulations should focus. Specifically, our results show that new regulations should foster 
communication between firms and their stakeholders while attempting to improve the quality of 
earnings reported by firms. Finally, stakeholders such as shareholders, potential and current 
investors, and analysts should consider the institutional context and the effects such contexts can 
have on firm behaviour when making their investment decisions or when preparing their 
investment advice. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant 
literature, section 3 addresses the data and methodology and section 4 presents the results. The 
paper concludes in section 5 with a discussion and conclusions. 
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2 Literature and hypotheses 
The use of firm resources for CSR activities has been much debated by academics and 
practitioners alike. According to Miras-Rodriguez et al. (2015), Castro et al. (2016), Schons and 
Steinmeier (2016), CSR activities may improve firm performance, create value (Maso et al. 2017), 
and/or improve corporate image (Castro et al. 2016) and reputation (Perez and Bosque 2015; Lin 
et al. 2016). Conversely, Friedman (1970) argues that CSR activities generally signal an 
irresponsible use of firm resources or are simply window-dressing (Cai et al. 2012), leading to 
deteriorating firm performance in either event (Miras-Rodriguez et al. 2015). 
According to agency theory as formulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), separating the interests 
of shareholders and managers creates agency problems within a firm, which consequently leads to 
managers pursuing their own individual interests as opposed to shareholders’ interests. Jensen 
(2001) extends agency theory to firms that are subject to more than one principal. In such a 
setting, firms are subject to stakeholders other than shareholders, such as employees, 
communities, governments, creditors, etc. Firms are thus expected not only to meet the goal of 
value maximisation for shareholders but also to address the requirements and expectations of 
those principals and stakeholders enumerated above. Jensen (2001) hypothesises that when a firm 
attempts to meet the demands of many stakeholders with myriad objectives, management is left 
unaccountable with regard to the stewardship of the firm’s resources. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) explain that monitoring and accountability are among those measures 
that have been proven to mitigate the agency problem and to align the interests of managers with 
the goals of principals. In the absence of clear criteria for monitoring and accountability, 
managers can otherwise pursue their personal interests. For example, rent-seeking managers can 
attempt to hide the firm’s true performance from stakeholders by employing EM; in other words, 
managers can use their discretion in financial reporting to dampen economic losses and overstate 
economic gains. 
6	
	
Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: EM and CSP have a positive relationship. 
Later studies extend the CSR literature by contextualising its effects by country (Jamali and 
Mirshak 2006), the financial outcome expected (Scholtens and Kang 2013), the type of 
stakeholder (Schons and Steinmeier 2016), and more recently by culture (Miras-Rodriguez et al. 
2015; Maso et al. 2017). With regard to the first stream in the literature, Matten and Moon (2008: 
407) argue that “national differences in CSR can be explained by historically grown institutional 
frameworks that shape national business systems”. According to these authors, a national 
business system “shares key features with the varieties of capitalism approaches that distinguish 
coordinated market economies and liberal market economies”. An institutional framework that 
encourages coordinated activities between its social and economic actors is expected to include 
strong elements of implicit CSR, resulting in firms addressing stakeholder issues in collective 
rather than individual terms. In coordinated market economies, stakeholders would thus often be 
involved in formulating CSR requirements. By contrast, in the framework of liberal market 
economies in which individualism, democratic pluralism and utilitarianism prevail, individual 
corporations normally articulate their own version of societal responsibilities (Matten and Moon 
2008). 
Theoretically, Aguilera et al. (2007) argue that the institutional framework in which firms operate 
influences managers’ behaviour. In the Anglo-Saxon model in which shareholders as the principal 
encourage managers to engage in CSR - managers tend to choose strategies that yield benefits in 
the near future. However, in continental Europe, which is characterised by high levels of 
involvement of stakeholders other than shareholders (such as creditors), managers tend to choose 
CSR strategies that have a longer-term focus. 
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Consistent with these expectations, prior studies have found that CSP varies across countries 
with different national business systems (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Ioannis and Serafeim 
2012; Duran and Bajo 2013). Moreover, firms in the liberal market economies of the Anglo-
Saxon countries exhibit higher CSP than those in the coordinated market economies of 
continental Europe. Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) explain that firms in liberal market 
economies engage in explicit CSR activities to mitigate institutionalised forms of stakeholder 
participation, whereas firms in coordinated market economies engage in more implicit CSR 
activities. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that different institutional settings affect managerial behaviour by 
presenting managers with different types of opportunities to pursue their personal interests. In 
particular, we hypothesise that when its institutional framework weakens a firm’s ability to 
monitor its managers, managers can then pursue their own personal interests while presumably 
fulfilling principals’ expectations. When firms are subject to multiple principals as they are in 
coordinated market economies, it may lead to monitoring by the principals. However, having 
multiple monitors can weaken managerial accountability as monitoring mechanisms may conflict 
with one another (Misangyi and Acharya 2014). Consequently, managers can find opportunities 
to divert firm resources while appearing to address principals’ requirements. In other words, the 
multiple-objective hypothesis (Chih et al. 2008) is more supported in coordinated market 
economies in which representative business associations are frequently directly involved in 
defining and legitimising corporate actors’ proper obligations. 
Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: EM is associated more positively with CSR in coordinated market economies than in liberal 
market economies. 
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3 Research design 
Sample and data 
We obtain our sample by combining data from various databases. First, we select all European 
companies whose corporate governance, environmental, and social score data are available on 
ASSET4 for the 2002-13 period. We then collect their accounting and financial data from 
Worldscope and DataStream, separately. To be included in the sample, a firm must have annual 
accounting and financial data available, in addition to available CSP data. Further, similar to 
studies in the literature (e.g., Choi et al. 2013), we exclude financial firms because the nature of 
EM, the dependent variable in our study, differs substantially between industrial and financial 
firms. After applying these criteria, the final dataset consists of 749 firms. 
 
Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable, EM, assesses a firm’s earnings aggressiveness. According to Dechow 
and Skinner (2000), earnings aggressiveness describes the behaviour of managers in delaying the 
recognition of losses and/or accelerating the recognition of gains to meet specific earnings 
targets. Following Chih et al. (2008)1, our dependent variable is constructed as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑀!" =
(!"#$%$&'!"!!"# !"#! !"#$%!")/!"#$%& !" !!!"#$ !"#$#%&'(&)!" 
!"#$%!"!!
,   (1) 
 
where net cash flowsit = CF from operationsit – (CF from investingit + CF from financingit). In 
addition, we obtain CF from operations by subtracting the accrual component from earnings. 
Following Dechow (1994), the accrual component is constructed as follows:  
 
																																								 																				
1 To control for differences in firm size and performance, we scale using the product of the number of shares 
outstanding and their lagged price and not using lagged total assets, as in Chih et al. (2008). 
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𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠!"  =  
∆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠!" –  ∆𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ & 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠!"  –  (∆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠!"  
–  ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠!" –  ∆𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!")  
–  𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 & 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠!" ,     (2) 
where   represents a change from year t-1 to year t. 
Independent variables 
In the past, constructing a truly representative measure of CSP has been difficult for several 
reasons. As such a measure represents a multi-dimensional concept, we study both individual 
dimensions and aggregate CSP. The corporate governance, economic, environmental, and social 
dimensions of CSR are available in ASSET4. Following Gargouri et al. (2010), we use the 
corporate governance, environmental, and social metrics to construct aggregate CSP. Given the 
absence of theoretical guidance on how best to construct the aggregate measure, we utilise the 
convention established by Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) and assign equal weights to the 
individual scores in constructing the aggregate CSP score. 
The variables are defined as: 
governance: the score on the corporate governance dimension, which measures a firm's 
systems and processes that ensure that board members and executives act in 
the best interest of shareholders; 
environment: the score on the environmental dimension, which measures a firm's impact on 
living and non-living natural systems, including the air, land, and water, as well 
as on complete ecosystems; 
society:  the score on the social dimension, which measures a firm's capacity to create 
trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society using its best 
management practices; 
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CSP: the arithmetic average of the governance, environment and society scores. 
Firm control variables 
In addition, firm characteristics also affect a firm’s EM practices (Barua et al. 2010). To control 
for these factors, we use the following control variables: 
leverage: total debt over total assets; 
profitability: return on assets; 
size: natural logarithm of total assets; 
dindustry: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s primary industry is basic materials, oil 
& gas, or utilities, and 0 otherwise2; and 
dtime: an indicator variable equal to 1 if the year is during the 2008-13 period, and 0 
otherwise. 
Model 
We estimate our panel data using the model below: 
1, , ; 1, ,it it it ity v u i N t Tʹ= + + = =x β K K  (3) 
where 𝑦!" is our dependent variable for firm i at time t, 𝒙!" is a vector of covariates, 𝑣!" is an 
unobservable time-constant firm effect, 𝑢!" is an idiosyncratic error term, and 𝛃 is a vector of 
coefficients to be estimated. Our dependent variable is EM, as defined in Equation (1). The 
vector of covariates includes CSP scores and (firm and time) control variables. All continuous 
variables have been winsorized at 1% on both tails. 
We analyse the relationship between the EM and CSP scores by applying a plethora of static and 
dynamic econometric models. In static models, all covariates are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous. We employed the Breush-Pagan test to check for the presence of firm-specific 
heterogeneity and used Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) estimators. As the 
																																								 																				
2 We construct a categorisation similar to that of Jackson and Apostolakou (2010). Industry classifications are 
available from DataStream. 
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Hausman test preferred the FE estimator to the RE estimator3, the next section discusses only 
the results from the FE estimations. In fact, a FE estimation is well suited to our case as it allows 
the removal of theoretical and cross-sectional variations in the variables of interest due to gradual 
changes in firm characteristics over time (Zhou 2001). To address a wider form of endogeneity, 
we also estimate dynamic models using a system GMM estimator (Green 2011) in which all 
covariates (excluding time invariant dummies) are assumed to be endogenous and instrumented 
with their own lags. To investigate the effects of the institutional frameworks, the sample is 
divided into two groups: (1) coordinated market economies, in which firms are encapsulated in a 
system of wide organisational responsibilities emanating from a high level of interdependencies 
and interactions among stakeholders (Matten and Moon 2008); and (2) liberal market economies, 
a framework originating from the Anglo-Saxon model that allows firms to articulate their own 
version of social responsibilities (Matten and Moon 2008). We then estimate Equation (3) for 
each of the groups. In all the estimations, we use robust standard errors clustered by firm 
(Gujarati and Porter 2009). 
4 Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables. The average level of EM is higher in 
coordinated market economies than in liberal market economies, and this difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, as indicated in the last column of the table. This result is consistent 
with La Porta et al. (1998), who found a relatively weak quality of accounting in coordinated 
market economies. EM in coordinated market economies also presents higher levels of variation 
around the average value than it does in liberal market economies. Governance, environment, 
social and CSP scores range from 0 to 100, with an average of approximately 60, except for the 
governance score. Moreover, the governance score is significantly higher in liberal market 
economies than in coordinated market economies. By contrast, environmental and social scores 
are significantly higher in coordinated market economies than in liberal market economies. 
																																								 																				
3 Results available upon request. 
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The correlation matrix reported in Table 2 reveals that environmental and social scores are highly 
correlated with a coefficient of 0.75, suggesting that firms that focus on environmental matters 
also focus on social matters, which reflects the interconnectedness of the two issues. EM is 
negatively correlated with the governance score and positively correlated with the environmental 
and social scores. As managerial behaviour is influenced by a firm’s governance structure, a 
relatively high correlation between EM and the governance score is expected. 
Table 3 summarises the results from the FE estimations chosen by the Hausman tests. Panel A 
shows that the relationship between EM and CSP is positive and statistically significant, which is 
consistent with Gargouri et al. (2010:321, 322), who state that the “satisfaction of a wider group 
of stakeholders is associated with a lack of performance criteria by which to appraise managers 
and facilitate managerial discretion, notably with respect to EM”. Moreover, the results support 
hypothesis H1, which predicts a positive relationship between EM and CSP. The results in Panel 
A of Table 3 are also in line with the multiple-objectives hypothesis formulated by Chih et al. 
(2008), who predicted that firms portrayed as socially responsible engage in EM to disguise their 
actual engagement in their own interests at the expense of stakeholders. In this context, our 
results suggest that CSR may indeed be used to camouflage managerial opportunistic behaviour. 
In addition, the results from Panels B and C together substantiate hypothesis H2 that the 
institutional framework empowers agency conflicts. Panel B of Table 3 shows that in coordinated 
market economies, the relationship between EM and CSP is positive and significant at the 5% 
level, although the main driver of the relationship is the firm’s governance score. The failure of 
the governance structure to inhibit managerial EM may reflect the effectiveness (or lack thereof) 
of governance in coordinated market economies. In light of the institutional context, this result 
suggests that institutionalised stakeholder involvement in coordinated market economies may 
have provided managers with the opportunity to pursue personal goals. By contrast, the results in 
Panel C show that neither CSP nor any of the individual aspects of CSP affects EM in liberal 
market economies. The coefficients of the control variables in all three panels are also notable. 
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The positive and statistically significant coefficients of profitability and size in all the models 
indicate that larger and more profitable firms have a tendency to engage in more EM. 
We then perform “poolability” tests4 on estimates of static panel regressions. These tests examine 
the statistical differences in the coefficients of the different measures of CSP across subsamples. 
The difference between the coefficients estimated within each subsample is indicative of the 
effect that the institutional framework has on the relationship between EM and CSP observed in 
the panel models. As the differences with regard to governance and CSP are positive and statistically 
significant, the relationship between EM and our representative measure of CSP (and of 
corporate governance quality) is more strongly positive in coordinated market economies than in 
liberal market economies. 
In this type of study, there are two potential issues in the data that can produce misleading 
conclusions. These issues involve the possibility that managerial EM practices themselves led to 
the decisions to engage in CSR or that factors other than CSP are affecting or causing these EM 
practices. To investigate these two issues, we re-estimate Equation (3) using a dynamic panel 
estimation approach. Although the FE models utilised in Table 3 address the second issue (Carter 
et al. 2010), dynamic panel models can account for both issues (Wintoki et al. 2012). Panel A in 
Table 4 shows that the effects of governance and overall CSP remain positive and significant at 
the 5% level in coordinated market economies. Moreover, although the positive effects of the 
environmental score on EM become clear, the effect of CSP on EM remains insignificant in 
liberal market economies. The effects of profitability and size on EM persist, while the effects of 
industry are insignificant. Thus, even after controlling for potential issues that can lead to 
misleading conclusions, the results in Table 4 corroborate those in Table 3. The results in Table 4 
reinforce the notion that firm EM is positively related to firm CSP but that the relationship 
depends on the institutional environment in which firms operate. 
																																								 																				
4 Results available upon request. 
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Furthermore, the results from Tables 3 and 4 reveal that an improved governance score in 
coordinated market economies is associated with an increase in firm EM, although no such 
relationship is observed in liberal market economies, suggesting that in countries with relatively 
weak governance, an improved governance score may not necessarily imply improved 
governance. For instance, Xie et al. (2003) find that corporate boards and audit committees with a 
high proportion of outside directors mitigate EM only when the members of the board and the 
committee have corporate or financial backgrounds and only when the board and audit 
committee play an active role (see also Peasnell et al. 2005). Hence, an increase in the number of 
outside directors on the board and/or the audit committee may appear to be an improvement in 
corporate governance while in fact providing only minimal indications of board effectiveness. 
The governance score in ASSET4 is constructed based on a list covering more than 100 aspects 
of board function and structure, most of which involve board composition, such as board 
independence and diversity, and assurances that monitoring mechanisms are in place, such as the 
presence of a nomination committee. Fewer than five items on the list involve the number of 
board meetings per year and the background of board members.5 In this light, our results suggest 
that engaging in improvements in governance in coordinated market economies may not yield 
actual improvements in the effectiveness of firm governance. Moreover, Oritz-de-Mandojana et 
al. (2016) find that the national institutional context plays an important role regarding the effects 
that corporate governance can have on a firm’s environmental sustainability practices. 
5 Discussions and Conclusions 
This paper investigates the relationship between EM and CSP. By employing European-wide 
data, we explore the effects of the institutional context on that relationship and find that firms 
with high CSP engage in more EM. Moreover, this positive relationship is observed only in 
coordinated market economies. Our findings support the notion that monitoring managers using 
																																								 																				
5 A detailed description of the list of features covered by the ASSET4 corporate governance score is available upon 
request. 
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specific criteria is not effective in coordinated market economies in which these managers are 
expected to serve all of the firm’s multiple stakeholders as opposed to pursuing value 
maximization alone as an objective. Managers treat this context as an opportunity to divert firm 
resources to pursue their own interests. 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it investigates the importance 
of the institutional context in understanding the effects that CSR has on firms. Moreover, the 
European-wide sample in our study provides relevant and useful insights for policymaking in 
which policies tend to be harmonised across the countries. Finally, our findings have important 
implications for both regulators and firm stakeholders. Thus, regulators should consider the 
differences between national institutional contexts when attempting to harmonise CSR 
regulations across countries in the region, as a one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to succeed. 
This study also highlights areas in which new regulations can be targeted. For instance, new 
regulations introduced in coordinated market economies should encourage firms to engage 
proactively in CSR while explicitly communicating their activities to stakeholders. Moreover, 
these new regulations should be introduced hand-in-hand with new regulations to improve the 
quality of earnings reported by firms. The results also call for regulations to improve corporate 
governance effectiveness in coordinated market economies. Additionally, our findings should 
help sensitise stakeholders and analysts to the importance of considering the potential impact of 
the institutional context on firm behaviour when considering choices for their investments. 
Some potential limitations of our study will provide opportunities for future research. First, 
future studies could utilise different measures of EM and different measures of CSP to explore 
the effects of the institutional framework on managers’ strategic decisions. For example, although 
we use earnings aggressiveness as a proxy for EM, other proxies (such as earnings smoothing and 
earnings loss avoidance) can be considered to test the sensitivity of managers’ choice of EM 
practices. Finally, the positive relationship between EM and the governance score is intriguing. 
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Future research might look more closely into how the effectiveness of governance actually 
changes as firms improve their governance score in coordinated market economies. 
Despite its limitations, our research nonetheless provides important information to investors and 
policy makers alike regarding the reliability of CSR policies. It reveals that firm’ incentives for 
incessantly pursuing socially responsible norms and governance practices may be secretly 
motivated by the desire to present firms’ earnings in a better light and that the institutional 
framework plays a role as well. Therefore, on one hand, policy makers should introduce detailed 
guidelines to ensure that CSR policies are based on actual plans with the right intentions. On the 
other hand, socially responsible investors should assess firms’ CSR policies with caution. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
  Whole sample (a) Coordinated market economies (b) Liberal market economies Diff. (b)-(a) 
  Observations Mean Median SD Mean Median SD T-test 
EM 749 0.6376 0.6457 0.3917 0.0352 0.0069 0.1574 -0.6024 *** 
governance 754 46.0843 45.6650 26.2547 70.8940 74.4100 17.9851 24.8097 *** 
environment 754 67.4930 80.7100 28.7722 59.4515 63.8500 26.7497 -8.0415 *** 
society 754 67.8066 77.9500 28.0264 63.2527 68.6800 25.6804 -4.5539 ** 
CSP 754 60.3849 66.3367 23.6793 64.4861 67.8067 20.1826 4.1012 *** 
leverage (%) 751 37.4979 38.6900 19.5063 34.1176 34.6150 22.2035 -3.3803 ** 
profitability (%) 751 6.8140 6.0800 4.6628 7.9485 7.5200 4.9248 1.1345 *** 
size 752 15.6065 15.6063 1.3682 14.1944 13.8802 1.3392 -1.4121 *** 
    %     %         
dindustry 754 0.2516     0.2344     -0.0171   
 *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2: Correlation matrix. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) EM 1.0000 
                
  
(2) governance -0.3006 *** 1.0000 
              
  
(3) environment 0.1145 *** 0.3603 *** 1.0000 
            
  
(4) society 0.0743 *** 0.4455 *** 0.7466 *** 1.0000 
          
  
(5) CSP -0.0397 ** 0.7211 *** 0.8600 *** 0.8894 *** 1.0000 
        
  
(6) leverage 0.0125 
 
0.0102 
 
0.0809 *** 0.1151 *** 0.0845 *** 1.0000 
      
  
(7) profitability 0.2344 *** 0.0035 
 
-0.1430 *** -0.0922 *** -0.0949 
 
-0.2946 *** 1.0000 
    
  
(8) size 0.3656 *** 0.0620 *** 0.4915 *** 0.4720 *** 0.4187 *** 0.2583 *** -0.1876 *** 1.0000 
  
  
(9) dindustry 0.0746 *** 0.0287 ** 0.0811 *** 0.1071 *** 0.0877 *** -0.0202 * -0.0522 *** 0.1566 *** 1.0000   
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Fixed-effect panel estimation results. 
Panel A: The whole sample 
FE-OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. 
constant -0.7204 0.2506 *** -0.7778 0.2500 *** -0.7870 0.2504 *** -0.7430 0.2536 *** 
governance 0.0009 0.0003 ***                   
environment       0.0003 0.0003               
society             0.0001 0.0003         
CSP                   0.0008 0.0004 * 
leverage -0.0010 0.0004 ** -0.0011 0.0004 ** -0.0011 0.0004 ** -0.0011 0.0004 ** 
profitability 0.0414 0.0022 *** 0.0415 0.0022 *** 0.0415 0.0022 *** 0.0414 0.0022 *** 
size 0.0558 0.0164 *** 0.0614 0.0165 *** 0.0629 0.0165 *** 0.0574 0.0169 *** 
dtime -0.0508 0.0102 *** -0.0421 0.0103 *** -0.0404 0.0102 *** -0.0468 0.0103 *** 
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Regression F/c2 84.05   *** 82.29   *** 81.72   *** 82.38   *** 
R2 overall 0.1040     0.1388     0.1388     0.1261     
Observations 5991     5937     5937     5937     
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel B: Coordinated market economies 
FE-OLS Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. 
constant -0.7366 0.3913 * -0.8602 0.3856 ** -0.8604 0.3910 ** -0.7864 0.3961 ** 
governance 0.0011 0.0003 ***                   
environment       0.0003 0.0004               
society             0.0002 0.0004         
CSP                   0.0010 0.0005 ** 
leverage -0.0007 0.0007   -0.0009 0.0007   -0.0009 0.0007   -0.0008 0.0007   
profitability 0.0669 0.0023 *** 0.0672 0.0023 *** 0.0672 0.0023 *** 0.0671 0.0023 *** 
size 0.0581 0.0249 ** 0.0675 0.0247 *** 0.0681 0.0252 *** 0.0605 0.0257 ** 
dtime -0.0578 0.0135 *** -0.0452 0.0135 *** -0.0442 0.0135 *** -0.0529 0.0138 *** 
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Regression F/c2 183.39   *** 182.15   *** 182.62   *** 181.55   *** 
R2 overall 0.2922     0.2983     0.2969     0.2979     
Observations 3868     3829     3829     3829     
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel C: Liberal market economies 
FE-OLS Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. 
constant -0.3345 0.2014 * -0.3350 0.1980 * -0.3368 0.2003 * -0.3401 0.2006 * 
governance -0.0002 0.0002                     
environment       -0.0001 0.0002               
society             -0.0002 0.0001 *       
CSP                   -0.0003 0.0002   
leverage 0.0001 0.0002   0.0001 0.0002   0.0002 0.0002   0.0001 0.0002   
profitability 0.0034 0.0010 *** 0.0034 0.0010 *** 0.0034 0.0010 *** 0.0034 0.0010 *** 
size 0.0244 0.0140 * 0.0242 0.0129 * 0.0249 0.0133 * 0.0254 0.0134 * 
dtime -0.0098 0.0054 * -0.0103 0.0068   -0.0098 0.0065   -0.0089 0.0061   
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Regression F/c2 5.10   *** 5.87   *** 6.30   *** 6.35   *** 
R2 overall 0.0011     0.0014     0.0044     0.0038     
Observations 2123     2108     2108     2108     
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Dynamic panel estimation results. 
Panel A: Coordinated market economies 
SYS-GMM Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. 
constant -0.9718 0.4186 ** -1.1517 0.4299 *** -1.0737 0.4257 ** -0.9587 0.4294 ** 
lag1 0.0452 0.0242 * 0.0457 0.0239 * 0.0465 0.0236 ** 0.0445 0.0258 * 
lag2 -0.1421 0.0207 *** -0.1506 0.0173 *** -0.1485 0.0174 *** -0.1464 0.0172 *** 
governance 0.0012 0.0004 ***                   
environment       0.0012 0.0005 **             
society             0.0008 0.0005         
CSP                   0.0019 0.0007 *** 
leverage -0.0039 0.0009 *** -0.0039 0.0008 *** -0.0040 0.0007 *** -0.0039 0.0008 *** 
profitability 0.0635 0.0031 *** 0.0630 0.0032 *** 0.0633 0.0033 *** 0.0634 0.0032 *** 
size 0.0863 0.0273 *** 0.0953 0.0280 *** 0.0934 0.0271 *** 0.0818 0.0283 *** 
dindustry -0.0332 0.1321   0.0729 0.1242   -0.0315 0.1282   -0.0080 0.1301   
dtime -0.0515 0.0166 *** -0.0615 0.0173 *** -0.0535 0.0171 *** -0.0602 0.0169 *** 
Regression c2 919.07   *** 955.45   *** 900.50     1014.79   *** 
Observations 3298     3260     3260     3260     
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel B: Liberal market economies 
SYS-GMM Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. 
constant -0.2755 0.4364   -0.2844 0.4882   -0.3054 0.7063   -0.3084 0.4375   
lag1 0.6153 0.1387 *** 0.6099 0.1113 *** 0.6025 0.0715 *** 0.6012 0.0882 *** 
lag2 0.0492 0.1331   0.0413 0.0659   0.0365 0.2518   0.0379 0.1703   
governance -0.0002 0.0011                     
environment       -0.0005 0.0003 **             
society             -0.0009 0.0012         
CSP                   -0.0010 0.0013   
leverage -0.0001 0.0007   -0.0001 0.0005   0.0000 0.0007   -0.0001 0.0009   
profitability 0.0030 0.0010 *** 0.0029 0.0009 *** 0.0031 0.0023   0.0030 0.0016 * 
size 0.0195 0.0372   0.0210 0.0368   0.0239 0.0544   0.0250 0.0372   
dindustry 0.0109 0.0425   0.0131 0.0466   0.0284 0.0277   0.0116 0.0910   
dtime -0.0010 0.0053   0.0000 0.0098   0.0003 0.0089   0.0027 0.0065   
Regression c2 84.79   *** 973.83   *** 524.06   *** 134.37   *** 
Observations 1893     1878     1878     1878     
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
